

Message Text

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E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: MNUC, PARM, SW
SUBJECT: IMPLICATIONS FOR SWEDEN OF 600-KILOMETER CRUISE MISSILE

1. THE CURRENT VISIT OF DR. KISSINGER AND THE RECENT STOCKHOLM SPEECH OF FINNISH PRESIDENT KEKKONEN (STOCKHOLM 1902) HAVE FOCUSED ATTENTION AGAIN ON THE QUESTION: WILL A SALT AGREEMENT PLACING A 600 MILE LIMIT ON SUBMARINE-LAUNCHED CRUISE MISSILES HAVE ANY EFFECT ON NORDIC AND PARTICULARLY ON SWEDISH SECURITY?

2. DR. KISSINGER DEALT WITH THE QUESTION BLUNTLY. WE ARE TOLD THAT WHEN KNUT THYBERG (MFA DIRECTOR FOR POLITICAL AFFAIRS) RAISED THIS QUESTION DURING KISSINGER'S MEETING JUNE 4 WITH FOREIGN MINISTER SODER, KISSINGER DISMISSED IT AS A STUPID QUESTION. WHEN ERIK PIERRE OF SWEDISH RADIO RAISED IT AT THE KISSINGER PRESS CONFERENCE JUNE 5, KISSINGER AGAIN TREATED IT LIGHTLY AND SAID SWedes "COULD SLEEP SOUNDLY TONIGHT" DESPITE THE POSSIBILITY OF 600-MILE SUBMARINE-LAUNCHED CRUISE MISSILES. IN FACT KISSINGER SAID TO MRS. SODER THAT THE SUB-LAUNCHED CRUISE MISSILES WOULD NOT BE INTENDED FOR LAND TARGETS, AND THUS SWEDISH TERRITORY WAS NOT INVOLVED. (IT MAY BE WORTH NOTING THAT SOMEWHAT IN CONTRAST TO THIS PRESENTATION, WHEN HELMUT SONNENFELDT WAS IN STOCKHOLM MAY 24-26, WHEN ASKED ABOUT CONFIDENTIAL

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CRUISE MISSILES, HE NOTED THAT THE MURMANSK/KOLA PENINSUL AREA WOULD BE A PRIME TARGET FOR CERTAIN TYPES OF CRUISE MISSILES, AND THUS BE ACKNOWLEDGED AT LEAST BY IMPLICATION THAT SWEDISH SECURITY COULD BE AFFECTED TO SOME DEGREE.)

3. THE DEPARTMENT IS FAMILIAR WITH THE WAY THIS

QUESTION WAS RAISED BY KEKKONEN IN HIS STOCKHOLM SPEECH MAY 8. HIS TREATMENT OF THE SUBJECT WAS NOT PARTICULARLY APPRECIATED BY OUR SWEDISH FRIENDS, WHO FOUND THE LINKAGE OF CRUISE MISSILES TO A NUCLEAR-FREE-ZONE IN THE NORDIC AREA FORCED AND ARTIFICIAL.

4. OUR FRIENDS IN THE FOREIGN MINISTRY TELL US PRIVATELY THAT OPINION IS DIVIDED EVEN WITHIN THE SWEDISH GOVERNMENT. SOME BELIEVE THERE IS A GENUINE QUESTION TO BE ANSWERED, OTHERS BELIEVE THE WHOLE ISSUE IS ARTIFICIAL. TWO ASPECTS ARE APPARENT. ONE IS THAT IN ITS BALANCED APPROACH TO THE GREAT POWERS, SWEDEN FINDS IT CONVENIENT TO RAISE US CRUISE MISSILES AT THE SAME TIME AS IT RAISES SOVIET NUCLEAR-WEAPON SUBMARINES IN THE BALTIC, I.E. TO DEFEND THE INTEGRITY OF THE NORDIC AREA FROM ANY DESTABILIZING NUCLEAR ENCROACHMENT FROM EAST OR WEST. THE SECOND ASPECT, HOWEVER, IS THE MOOT ONE, AND THAT IS WHETHER SWEDISH SECURITY WOULD ACTUALLY BE AFFECTED IN ANY CONCRETE SENSE BY A US-USSR AGREEMENT TO LIMIT SUBMARINE-LAUNCHED CRUISE MISSILES TO 600 KILOMETERS.

5. WE HAVE MENTIONED THIS QUESTION BEFORE AND HAVE HAD SOME INFORMAL GUIDANCE FROM THE DEPARTMENT. WE RECOGNIZE THAT A USG ANSWER IS DIFFICULT TO FORMULATE FOR MANY REASONS, AMONG THEM THE UNFINISHED SALT NEGOTIATIONS AND USG

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RELUCTANCE TO DISCUSS STRATEGIC DISPENSATIONS IT MIGHT MAKE AS A RESULT OF SALT II. THIS MESSAGE IS MERELY TO SIGNAL THAT AS THE KISSINGER VISIT INDICATED, THE QUESTION REMAINS A LIVE ONE HERE IN SWEDEN, AND WILL PRESUMABLY BE RAISED AGAIN.

KENNEDY-MINOTT

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